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I. INTRODUCTION

Islamic law prohibits any charges or interest payments on debt,
including home loans.1 The Islamic interest prohibition is more than just a
law; it is a fundamental tenant of the religion and philosophy of Islamic
economics.2 Many Muslims must choose to either adhere to religious beliefs
or achieve the “American Dream” because the Islamic prohibition against
interest conflicts with America’s interest-based home financing.3 For some,
abandoning Islam is not an option.4 The need to reconcile religious beliefs
with the American Dream has led to the emergence of Islamic-compliant
financing programs across the country.5 Minnesota’s New Markets Mortgage
1

See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the Islamic prohibition of riba).
See infra note 28 (explaining the rationale behind riba including the idea that
money has no intrinsic value and that profit from the principle amount must be attributable to
something concrete).
3
See Elliot B. Smith, Dream Fulfilled Helps Muslims Realize Theirs, USA
TODAY (Feb. 25, 2005), usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2005-02-24-islamicfinance-usat_x.htm (explaining the situation of Muslim families seeking help for Islamiccompliant loans).
4
Id.
5
See id. (explaining different types of Islamic-compliant financing).
2
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Program was one such program and the first to be quasi-government
sponsored.6 However, the program was soon halted, and the rise of antiSharia legislation continues to threaten the future of Islamic-compliant
financing agreements.7 The result: Islamic-compliant loan agreements are
invalid in state courts.8
This note argues that state courts must take a stance in favor of
enforcing Islamic choice of law provisions in financing contracts due to the
oppressive practices from the political branches of government and special
interest groups.9 Part II provides background information for the Islamic
prohibition against paying interest on late payments.10 This section also
describes the Restatement analysis of choice of law provisions, paying
particular attention to the elements that are most applicable to this subject.11
Part III begins by exploring the politically oppressive policies against
Islamic-compliant contracts.12 This section also discusses the events
surrounding the termination of the Minnesota New Markets Mortgage
program.13 Additionally, Part III introduces state legislation prohibiting
Islamic law and explains the role of special interest groups in drafting the
legislation.14 Arizona, South Dakota, and Oklahoma serve as three
examples.15 Finally, Part IV argues that the Oklahoma court’s handling of the
issue should serve as a model to other courts. Further, because state political
branches have been targeting Islamic-compliant contracts, future courts must
enforce Islamic choice of law provisions in loan agreements, even if the

6

See generally infra Part III.A (reporting the New Markets Mortgage Program).
See infra note 143 (compiling the attempts and implementation of Islamic law
bans in state courts).
8
See infra Part III.B.1 (noting the activities of APPA, a political group that has
drafted a model bill aimed at limiting Islamic law in state courts).
9
See infra Part IV.C.1 (explaining that courts are in a unique position and should
use their position to make a determination based on the facts with guidance from the
Restatement).
10
See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining Islamic law’s prohibition of interest
payments).
11
See infra Part II.B (explaining the public policy exception and relationship
exception to the general rule that choice of law provisions are considered valid).
12
See infra Part III.A–B (explaining the termination of the New Markets
Mortgage Program, the increase in state law proposals limiting Islamic law, and the special
interest groups invested in banning Islamic law).
13
See infra Part III.A.2 (noting former governor Tim Pawlenty’s political
ambitions terminated the program).
14
See infra Part III.B (describing state legislatures proposing laws that were
influenced or entirely drafted by special interest groups and individuals with an agenda against
Islam).
15
See infra Part III.B.2–3 (comparing the different types of legislation around the
country).
7
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court must invalidate anti-Islamic legislation.16 The standard the court should
adopt is the analysis in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which
enforces choice of law provisions unless the outcome is contrary to public
policy or the parties and transaction bear no relation to their choice of law.17
II. BACKGROUND
Two concepts are central to understanding the argument of this
article. The first is the traditional Islamic ban of charging or paying interest
for late payments, or riba.18 The second concept is the American
jurisprudence surrounding “choice of law” provisions in contracts embodied
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law.19
A. Sharia Law and Islamic-Compliant Financing
1. The Prohibition of Riba
The word “riba” directly translates to “increase.”20 The prohibition
of riba comes directly from the text of the Qur’an.21 As with many religious
concepts, the extent of the Islamic prohibition against interest rates is open to
interpretation.22 The concept of regulating unfair interest rates is not unique
to Islam, as many Western societies also have usury laws aimed at regulating
unfair interest rates.23 However, most scholars agree that the prohibition of
riba is broader, including interest rates that would pass usury regulations.24
The prohibition of riba is commonly interpreted to cover even interest rates
on late payments.25
16
See infra Part IV.B.1 (explaining the Tenth Circuit’s decision in favor of a
Muslim man who challenged a state constitutional amendment prohibiting Sharia or Islamic
law in state courts).
17
See infra Part IV.B.1–3 (applying the Restatement’s suggestion).
18
See Sina Ali Muscati, Late Payment in Islamic Finance, 6 UCLA J. ISLAMIC &
NEAR E.L. 47, 49 (2007) (introducing the concept on riba).
19
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988) (suggesting the
rule to apply to contractual choice of law provisions).
20
Barbara L. Seniawski, Riba Today: Social Equity, the Economy, and Doing
Business Under Islamic Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 701, 708 (2001).
21
Qur’an, 2:275-80; 3:130 (Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an Inc. 2003) (stating “Those
who devour [riba] will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil One by his touch has
driven to madness. That is because they say: ‘Trade is like [riba],’ but Allah has permitted
trade and forbidden [riba].”).
22
Muscati, supra note 18, at 48 (explaining the debate as to what type of interest
rates are or should be prohibited).
23
Muscati, supra note 18, at 49; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 334.03 (2012)
(prohibiting “usurious” contracts).
24
Seniawski, supra note 20, at 712–13 (explaining that the common
interpretation includes all interest, but arguing that it should not be so broad).
25
Id. at 712.
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Scholars argue that part of the prohibition against riba is a moral
justification to protect the poor from being exploited by the rich.26
Additionally, the prohibition of riba is based on fundamental beliefs of
economics unique to Islamic culture,27 which teaches that money has no
value in and of itself, and all profit must be connected to something other
than money that actually has value.28 The idea that economic exchanges must
be equal and profits fair is also related to this concept.29 Therefore, those
who choose to follow their faith and avoid paying interest do so not as a
convenient means to avoid being charged late payments, but because of a
fundamental disagreement on the nature of money and equitable profiting.
2. Alternative Financing Programs
Recognizing a need for financing that conforms to this belief system,
some institutions have established creative and successful Islamic-compliant
financing programs.30 Three models of financing currently dominate the
Islamic-compliant market.31 One is Ijara-wa-Iqtinaa, or “lease to own”, in
which the financing institution takes a lien in the property but gives title to
the prospective homebuyer.32 The homebuyer pays rent until the full cost is
paid.33 A second model, called Murabaha, or installment purchases, occurs
when a homebuyer negotiates a price with the seller, and the financing
institution purchases the home from the seller.34 The financing institution
then immediately sells the home to the homebuyer for periodic
installments.35 The third model, called Musharaka, occurs when the
homebuyer and financing institution purchase the home jointly as a limited

26

See id. (discussing whether the poor are disadvantaged by interest rates).
Id. (discussing Islamic views on microeconomics).
28
Muscati, supra note 18, at 50 (stating that “money on its own has no intrinsic
value,” and any additional profit from the “principal amount must be attributable to something
concrete”).
29
Seniawski, supra note 20, at 711; see Jean-Francois Seznec, Ethics, Islamic
Banking and the Global Financial Market, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Spring 1999, at 161–62
(explaining that profit from equal and fair transactions does not violate the prohibition of
riba).
30
See Smith, supra note 3; Huma Qureshi, Sharia-Compliant Mortgages Are
Here—and They’re Not Just for Muslims, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2008),
www.theguardian.com/money/2008/jun/29/mortgages.islam (explaining different types of
Islamic-compliant loans).
31
Id. (noting the three dominant models are Ijara-wa-Iqtinaa; Murabaha; and
Musharaka).
32
Id. (explaining the Ijara-wa-Iqtinaa model).
33
Id.
34
Id. (describing the role of the home-buyer and the financer).
35
Id.
27
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liability company.36 Over time, the homebuyer gains full ownership of the
purchase.37
In all three of these models the financing agency has made profit
without charging interest for late payments.38 One extremely successful
model is Lariba.39 Founded in 1987, Lariba offers “riba-free” financing for
home, car, and business loans.40 The Lariba model is a twist on Musharaka.41
In this model, Lariba will purchase the home jointly with the homebuyer and
then immediately sell its share to the homebuyer.42 Lariba takes a lien on the
property, with its share decreasing as the homebuyer pays the monthly
installments.43 Lariba will eventually own no shares and will then release the
lien on the property, usually after a contracted period of thirty years.44 The
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have even purchased
mortgages arising from these transactions.45
However, as with any contract, disputes among the parties
sometimes arise.46 Lenders offering Sharia-compliant financing recognize
that the nontraditional loans may raise eyebrows or be confusing for courts
asked to interpret them. For example, Lariba informs potential home buyers
that:
In order to protect our clients in case of adverse situations
against the possibility of excessive legal fees, unusual
language in the contracts that make them irregular and
36

Id.
Smith, supra note 3 (stating that the home-buyer’s equity will grow until they
have full ownership of the home).
38
Id. (describing the “$600 million Muslim mortgage market” as small but
growing); see also Qureshi, supra note 30 (describing the success of some Islamic-loan
providers).
39
Smith, supra note 3 (citing Lariba as a major company in the market).
40
The Lariba Model, LARIBA, https://www.lariba.com/home-financing.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2014) (describing the company as one that provides financing for home, car,
and business loans).
41
See id. (comparing the Lariba method to the “Declining Participation in
Usufruct,” also known as “Declining Musharaka”).
42
Id. (describing how the Lariba Model works).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Smith, supra note 3 (noting that Fannie Mae purchased $10 million in
Musharaka-style mortgages). After Fannie Mae’s involvement, the applications doubled from
roughly twenty-seven a month in 2002 to fifty-four a month in 2003. Id.; Thomas A. Fogarty,
Freddie Mac Now Buys Mortgages Held by Muslims, USA TODAY, available at
https://www.lariba.com/knowledge-center/articles/freddie-mac-usatoday.htm
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2014) (reporting Freddie Mac’s recent trend to buy mortgages for interest-free
loans).
46
See Paul E. Pompeo, East Meets West: A Comparison of Government Contract
Dispute Resolution in the Common Law and Islamic Systems, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L. & COMP.
L.J. 815, 837 (1992) (describing dispute resolution in the Islamic legal system).
37
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difficult to pursue legally, and the putting of name of
company on title with client, LARIBA uses standard
industry and regulatory sanctioned contracts and uses a rider
called the LARIBA Agreement which describes the process
followed above and the rental value used as the basis for the
payment calculations.47
The language above illuminates an issue that courts are likely to face in
resolving potential disputes: “unusual language in the contracts that make
them irregular and difficult to pursue legally.”48 Because these contracts are
written to comply with Islamic faith, they often contain provisions directing
disputes to be settled through Islamic law.49 These provisions are intended to
ensure the contract will be enforced as intended, providing consistency and
predictability—qualities desirable for any commercial transaction.50 It is
important to acknowledge that these contracts may have different language
rendering them difficult to enforce.51 It is equally important to note that the
different language, especially when the contract contains a provision
describing the process of its formation, also indicates an intention to have the
contract enforced differently than a standard loan contract.52 The use of
Arabic language, coupled with the language of the contract explicitly
referring to Islamic law, could be enough to be considered an “explicit
provision” directing resolution of the issue to Islamic law.53

47

The Lariba Model, supra note 40 (emphasis added).
Id.
49
See Michael J.T. McMillen, Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and
Capital Markets Development, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 427, 434, 437 (2007) (explaining that the
contract is written to comply with Sharia law and that the complexity of this contract may not
be handled well outside of Sharia law concepts).
50
Id. at 434–35 (providing contract language meant to provide these agreements
“. . . with the degree of certainty, consistency, predictability, and transparency of the Shari’ahcompliant structure, product, or transaction, and with the functioning of the relevant legal
regimes as risk allocators”).
51
Id. (using Arabic words such as “Haqul Manfa’aa” and “Milkul Raqabah” and
noting that some words are improperly translated, such as “lien” to “rahn,” when “rahn”
means “pawn” in Arabic).
52
McMillen, supra note 49, at 439 (stating that interest-free finance contracts
written to comply with Sharia law are also intended to be enforced by Sharia law).
53
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. c (1971)
(providing that the contracting parties “may spell out these terms in the contract” or
“incorporate into the contract by reference extrinsic material which may, among other things,
be the provisions of some foreign law”). If foreign law is provided for in the contract, the
Restatement states that “[i]n such instances, the forum will apply the applicable provisions of
the law of the designated state in order to effectuate the intentions of the parties. So much has
never been doubted.” Id.
48
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B. Guidance from the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 187
The general rule in the Restatement is a court should enforce a
provision that explicitly establishes a forum of law for dispute resolution,
also called a choice of law provision.54 The comments further recommend a
liberal interpretation of what constitutes an explicit provision, allowing
evidence of the intent of the parties and extrinsic evidence.55 The purpose is
to enforce the contract as the parties intended.56 The Restatement provides
two exceptions.57 One exception deals with public policy, and the other
grants an exception based on the relationship between the transaction and the
chosen law.58
1. The Public Policy Exception
As stated above, the Restatement recommends a rule enforcing
choice of law provisions.59 However, if applying the chosen law produces a
result contrary to the forum state’s clearly articulated public policy, the court
does not have to apply that law.60 Courts have refused to enforce choice of
law provisions based on public policy in a variety of contexts, often because
the chosen law would cause a substantial burden on one party.61 Courts have
commonly applied the public policy exception in both domestic and foreign
Islamic marriage contracts.62
54

Id. § 187(1)–(2).
Id. § 187 cmt. c.
56
See id. (asserting that the law of the chosen forum will be enforced).
57
See id. § 187(2)(a)–(b). The exceptions are invoked when:
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than
the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which,
under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
55

Id.

58
Id. (explaining that a court can elect not to enforce a choice of law provision in
a contract when “(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties . . . or (b)
application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a
state”).
59
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
60
Id. § 187(2)(b).
61
See, e.g., Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)
(marriage/divorce); JRT, Inc. v. TCBY Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 1995) (franchise
agreement); DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2006)
(noncompete agreement); In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., 96 F. App’x 753, 755 (2d Cir.
2004) (enforcing a provision choosing Norwegian law and applying Norwegian law).
62
See, e.g., Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 785; In re Marriage of Altayar & Muhyaddin,
No. 57475-2-I, 2007 WL 2084346, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (refusing to enforce
the prenuptial agreement of marriage bound under Islamic law because it was unfair); Aleem
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The public policy in many U.S. states favors an equitable
distribution of assets in a divorce proceeding.63 Applying the public policy
exception in the marriage context is not always as simple as invalidating the
choice of law provision to effectuate public policy.64 A comparison of the
outcome and reasoning in Aghili v. Saadanejadi65 with the outcome and
reasoning in Aleem v. Aleem demonstrates this.66
In Aghili, the court found a valid marriage partially because the
marriage was completed according to Islamic custom.67 The fact that the
couple never actually filed a marriage license with the state was not enough
to invalidate the marriage.68 Because the marriage was valid, the wife was
able to bring a divorce proceeding against her husband.69 This overruled the
lower court’s decision which refused to recognize a valid marriage, leaving
the wife without any recourse when the relationship ended.70 In Aleem, the
court enforced the marriage agreement, but not the Islamic divorce
proceedings.71 The divorce proceeding would have left the wife with no
property rights from the marriage.72 In both cases, the enforceability of the
v. Aleem, 931 A.2d 1123, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), aff'd, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008)
(holding that a marriage contract from Pakistan was enforceable in Maryland, but the
Pakistani law claiming that the wife has no property rights in a divorce was contrary to
Maryland public policy); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 96 (N.J. Ch. 2002) (upholding the
marriage as valid but dividing property according to principles of equity).
63
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (2012) (requiring a just and equitable
distribution); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-205 (West 2014) (requiring a fair and equitable
distribution).
64
Compare Aleem, 931 A.2d at 1134, with Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 786–87.
65
Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 786–87. Aghili negotiated a dowry with Saadatnejadi’s
father and agreed to pay 10,000 Iranian gold coins if he violated the contract. Id. at 786. The
couple received an Islamic blessing and filed a marriage license with the Mosque. Id. They
acquired, but did not file, a license with the state because Aghili refused to file the license
unless Saadatnejadi signed a prenuptial agreement. Id. The marriage deteriorated and
Saadatnejadi filed for divorce. Id. The appeals court upheld the marriage despite the filing
error. Id. at 789.
66
Aleem, 931 A.2d at 1134 (refusing to enforce divorce proceeding of a valid
marriage).
67
Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 788 (stating that it was clear the imam had authority to
administer the Islamic blessing).
68
Id. (“ . . . his failure to return the completed marriage license within the time
required by TENN. CODE § 36-3-303 does not undermine the validity of the marriage”).
69
Id. at 789 (remanding the case back to district court consistent with equitable
division principles).
70
Id. at 787 (citing the district court’s ruling that the marriage was invalid
because the couple did not file a marriage license with the state and the Islamic imam was not
qualified to solemnize the marriage under Tennessee law).
71
Aleem, 931 A.2d at 1127 (accepting the lower court’s factual determination that
the marriage was arranged and held in Pakistan, but ultimately referring to “divisible
divorce”).
72
Id. at 1134. The court explained:
[T]he “default” under Pakistani law is that Wife has no rights to property
titled in Husband's name, while the “default” under Maryland law is that
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Islamic proceedings was less important than the state’s policy favoring
equitable division of property upon divorce.73 The two courts had different
opinions on the validity of Islamic marriage and divorce proceedings to
achieve that policy.74
2. The Strong Relationship Between the Chosen Law and the Transaction
The court may also refuse to apply the chosen law when it “has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties’ choice.”75 If the chosen law has a substantial
relationship to the transaction, it is presumed that there is also a reasonable
basis for the choice.76 It is rare that parties do not have a reasonable basis for
their choice of law provision.77 Because of this, provisions are rarely deemed
unenforceable by this exception.78 The chosen law can be deemed
substantially related to the parties if they are familiar with the chosen law or
if the chosen law is better developed to deal with the content of the
contract.79

the wife has marital property rights in property titled in the husband’s
name. We hold that this conflict is so substantial that applying Pakistani
law in the instant matter would be contrary to Maryland public policy.
Id.

73

Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 785, 789 (reversing the lower court’s decision to grant
Aghili’s motion for summary judgment for an annulment, and granting Saadatneadi’s claim
for divorce); Aleem, 931 A.2d at 1135 (holding that the lower court was correct to apply
Pakistan law for determining the wife’s marital property).
74
In both cases, the wife received property through divorce. See Aleem, 931 A.2d
at1123; Aghili, 958 S.W.2d at 789 (upholding the validity of the marriage and remanding for
consistent proceedings).
75
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (emphasis added).
Comment g provides insight into what constitutes “reasonable” and “substantial relationship.”
The comment mentions that choosing a law for adventure’s sake would not be reasonable,
suggesting that most choices are reasonable. Id. § 187 cmt. g. The chosen law must have a
“substantial relationship” to either the parties of the contract or the subject matter of the
contract. Id. Finally, a choice of law may be reasonable even if it there is no substantial
relationship. Id.
76
Id. § 187 cmt. f.
77
Id. (noting “[c]ontracts are entered into for serious purposes and rarely, if ever,
will the parties choose a law without good reason for doing so”).
78
See id. But cf. Bank of New York v. Janowick, 470 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir.
2006) (invalidating contract that contained a New York choice of law provision, because no
party to the contract conducted business in, nor resided in, New York).
79
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f (“[W]hen
contracting in countries whose legal systems are strange to them as well as relatively
immature, the parties should be able to choose a law on the ground that they know it well and
that it is sufficiently developed. For only in this way can they be sure of knowing accurately
the extent of their rights and duties under the contract.”).
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Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enters., Inc. provides an example of how the
substantial relationship exception is applied.80 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals first determined the parties chose California law in their contract.81
The next inquiry was whether California had a substantial relationship to the
transaction.82 The court held that because some property involved in the
transaction was located in California and one party to the contract was
domiciled in California at the time the contract was made, the transaction
was substantially related to California. Therefore, the parties had a
reasonable basis for choosing it.83
3. The Sliding Scale
Further, the public policy exception and substantial relationship
exception work together to form a sliding scale.84 The more substantial the
relationship between the transaction and the chosen law, the more
fundamental the policy of the forum state must be to disregard the chosen
law in favor of the forum’s law.85 A recent federal case in Pennsylvania
applied the sliding scale.86 A Pennsylvania woman paid for credit repair
services from a Virginia store.87 The contract had a provision in small print
choosing Virginia law for disputes arising from the contract.88 The court
determined there was a substantial relationship between the contract and the
chosen law because the store was located in Virginia.89 The court further
reasoned that while it has a duty to protect consumers, it also has a duty to
protect businesses.90 The court ruled that public policy did not outweigh the
substantial relationship, and therefore applied Virginia law.91

80

Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enters., Inc., 802 F.2d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1146.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (“The more
closely the state of the chosen law is related to the contract and the parties, the more
fundamental must be the policy of the state of the otherwise applicable law to justify denying
effect to the choice-of-law provision.”).
85
Id.
86
Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 390 (3d Cir. 2007) (ruling the policy to
protect consumers did not outweigh the substantial relationship of Virginia law to Virginia
purchase agreements).
87
Id. at 374.
88
Id. at 390.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 390 (explaining “[t]hough it certainly is true that Pennsylvania has an
interest in protecting its consumers, we cannot say that Virginia has a lesser interest in
protecting businesses located in it”).
91
Id. at 390–91 (reasoning that because Virginia law applied due to the choice of
law provision, the inquiry as to whether the arbitration clause was unenforceable would
analyzed under Virginia law).
81
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Many financing institutions have creative solutions to help finance
major purchases for Muslims who adhere to a strict riba prohibition.92 Many
of these contracts understandably direct dispute resolution to be consistent
with the Islamic laws with which the contract was designed to comply.93 The
Restatement rule on choice of law provisions is clear: the chosen law should
presumably govern the contract.94 Only two narrow exceptions can overcome
the general rule: when the chosen law has no substantial relationship to the
transaction and no reasonable basis for selection, or when the result is
contrary to fundamental public policy.95
III. POLITICAL FORCES AGAINST ISLAMIC-COMPLIANT
FINANCING
Despite the clear jurisprudence enforcing any choice of law
provision, including Islamic law, political movements have increasingly
attempted to render these provisions unenforceable.96 This section will
explore a Minnesota executive agency’s role in Islamic-compliant home
financing, the ultimate cancellation of the program by a Minnesota governor,
and a general overview of anti-Islamic legislation sweeping states across the
nation.97 Finally, this section will focus on Oklahoma’s anti-Islamic laws and
highlight the role of the Oklahoma courts in protecting the validity of Islamic
choice of law provisions. 98 The Oklahoma and Minnesota examples are
meant to show the oppressive effect of the political process on Muslims who
wish to obtain financing, compared to the relative success courts have had in
protecting the Muslim population’s freedom to contract.
A. Minnesota’s New Markets Mortgage Program
In 2005, a record-breaking 15,546 people immigrated to
Minnesota.99 Almost half of those immigrants were from African countries
92

See supra Part II.A.1 (describing Lariba and other models of Islamic-compliant

financing).

93
See supra text accompanying notes 40–44 (describing the Lariba process for
creating contracts).
94
See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (describing the overall policy validating choice of law
provisions).
95
See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
96
See infra Parts III.A–C (explaining Minnesota’s New Markets Mortgage
Program’s termination and legislative enactments across the country).
97
See infra Part III.B (explaining the NMMP, MHFA, and Governor Pawlenty’s
role in cancelling the program).
98
See infra Part III.C (highlighting the important aspects of the Awad case).
99
Susan Brower, Record Number of Immigrants Arrived in Minnesota in 2005,
MINN. DEP’T OF ADMIN (July 11, 2006), http://www.demography.state.mn.us/
resource.html?Id=18677 (noting “[m]ore immigrants arrived in Minnesota in the year ending
Sept. 30, 2005 than in any of the previous 25 years, according to the U.S. Department of
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and 1,303 were from Somalia, a predominantly Muslim nation.100 Minnesota
already had one of the highest disparities of home ownership between white
people and people of color in the United States.101 Because of the Islamic
prohibition of riba, many Muslim immigrants were not able to obtain
financing for a home.102 Because so many in the immigrant population were
Muslim people who adhere to the riba prohibition, they had few options for
home financing.103 With such a large population lacking access to home
financing, the homeownership gap could only get worse.104 As the Emerging
Markets Initiative explained, homeownership is important to a stable
economy and is the central focus of achieving the American Dream.105
Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty created a task force specifically to deal
with the homeownership issues described above.106
Recognizing that a lack of homeownership in the Minnesota
immigrant community was an ongoing issue, Fannie Mae, the Minnesota
Housing Financing Agency, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
created The Emerging Markets Homeownership Initiative: A Business Plan
to Increase Homeownership in Minnesota’s Emerging Markets in 2005.107
Homeland Security. The 15,456 arrivals placed Minnesota 17th among the states in
immigration for the reporting period and accounted for 1.4 percent of the U.S. total”).
100
Id.
101
See FANNIE MAE ET AL., THE EMERGING MARKETS HOMEOWNERSHIP INITIATIVE:
A BUSINESS PLAN TO INCREASE HOMEOWNERSHIP IN MINNESOTA’S EMERGING MARKETS 72–73
(2005) available at http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/groups/homes/documents/webcontent/
mhfa_002552.pdf [hereinafter EMERGING MARKETS INITIATIVE] (citing 2003 American
Community Survey and MHFA staff tabulations and noting the disparity of home-ownership
between “White Owners” and “Owners of Color”).
102
See id. at 99, 53 (describing the ban of riba as a barrier to homeownership
among the Muslim community).
103
See Brower, supra note 99 (describing the immigrant demographics).
104
See EMERGING MARKETS INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 3, 53, 99 (defining the
purpose of the initiative to reverse the homeownership trend and stating that a third of
Minnesota immigrants were Somalian); A BUSINESS PLAN TO INCREASE HOMEOWNERSHIP IN
EMERGING MARKETS: 40,000 NEW EMERGING MARKET HOMEOWNERS BY 2012, 1, available at
http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/webcontent/mhfa_002593.pdf
[hereinafter BUSINESS P LAN] (defining the “emerging market” as the minority population and
discussing the growth of the emerging market).
105
EMERGING MARKETS INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 13, 3 (explaining that the
housing industry is fifteen percent of the gross domestic product (GDP); homeownership
fosters small businesses; it is a contributing factor to seeking higher education;
homeownership is “a central element of the ‘American dream;’” and that the majority of
American families have most of their assets tied to their home).
106
See Jacqueline King, Community Dividend, Homeownership Initiative Targets
Minnesota's Emerging Markets, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2005),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=2370#top
(describing the process of the Emerging Markets Initiative’s creation).
107
EMERGING MARKETS INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at title page (“Presented by:
Fannie Mae, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota Housing Finance Agency
. . . Accepted by Tim Pawlenty, Governor June 30, 2005”). The Emerging Markets Initiative
was created in tandem with the Business Plan which stated that “an aggressive and sustained
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The Initiative was a business plan set up to increase home ownership among
low-income immigrant and minority populations in Minnesota.108 The report
included a list of barriers minority populations face when trying to purchase
homes.109 One barrier was “cultural factors, preferences and immigration.”110
The report specifically mentioned the Islamic belief against paying interest
on late payments as one cultural factor.111 The plan contained an outreach
phase, which included developing “culturally-sensitive” plans and
products.112 The final “Innovate Structural Support” phase included
developing financing products that were suited for the immigrant populations
identified in the Initiative.113 Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty accepted
the proposal on June 30, 2005.114
1. The African Development Center and New Markets Mortgage Program
Mulki Hussein of the African Development Center (ADC) played a
role in creating the overall Emerging Markets Initiative.115 The entire ADC
played an important role in the creation and business planning of this
Initiative.116 The ADC was largely involved in the New Markets Mortgage
Program (NMMP), a specific financing product from the Emerging Markets
Initiative that offered interest-free loans. The NMMP was initially created for
effort to implement the strategies” was necessary to increase homeownership. See BUSINESS
PLAN, supra note 104, at 3.
108
See EMERGING MARKETS INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 1–4; The report notes
the history of the project:
In spring 2004, a variety of business and community groups convened
under the Emerging Markets Homeownership Initiative (EMHI). Its
primary goal was to create a business plan whereby the homeownership
industry and community groups could identify and implement objectives
that would significantly increase the homeownership rates among
Minnesota’s emerging markets.
Id. at 1.
109
Id. at 7; The barriers include: “1. Wealth and down payment 2. Credit and
lending practices 3. Cultural factors, preferences and immigration 4. Discrimination 5.
Information, marketing and outreach 6. Homebuyer counseling and financial education.” Id.
110
Id.
111
See id. at 99 (noting that principles of Islamic faith that prohibit charging an
interest often cause Muslims to avoid seeking to purchase a house).
112
See id. at 8 (explaining the “Expand and Tailor Outreach” phase of the business
plan).
113
Id. at 8. The initiative listed four strategies for improving structural support
including expanding access to entry cost assistance, developing products that are emerging
market friendly, acknowledging problems of the housing supply, and acknowledging the issue
of racism. Id.
114
EMERGING MARKETS INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at title page.
115
Id. at acknowledgements page (listing people who “provided noteworthy
contributions to the business planning process”).
116
Id. at 4 (listing ADC as an “Advisory Group” that was “instrumental” in the
Initiative).
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Muslims but was open to all people with a low-to-moderate income.117 The
ADC began developing the NMMP in early 2006, after the approval of the
Emerging Markets Initiative.118 The NMMP was finally a complete product
in late 2008, with the first participants preapproved in December.119
The Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) played a limited
role in NMMP.120 The ADC worked with potential buyers who were
financially eligible for the NMMP to get their credit to the point where they
could afford a home.121 The ADC required participants to attend homebuyer
workshops, meet with economic counselors, and obtain preapproval before
looking for a home.122 Chicago-based Devon Bank was the underwriter for
the home loans.123 MHFA’s only involvement before Devon Bank approved
the loan was to set a price limit for the home according to the participant’s
credit rating.124 MHFA purchased mortgages from ADC and Devon Bank
using the same fund as the other programs from the Emerging Markets
Initiative.125 Devon Bank and the other actors involved in the loan
maintained the process was very similar to a standard loan.126
2. Initial Growth and Ultimate Termination
The NMMP, though only in existence for a short time, was relatively
successful and garnered some support. Three families made it to the final
117

See MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, NEW MARKETS MORTGAGE PROGRAM
PROCEDURAL MANUAL 2, (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.mnhousing.gov/get/
MHFA_007623 [hereinafter NMMP MANUAL]; Hussein Samatar, Setting the Record Straight
on the New Markets Mortgage Program (NMMP), AFRICAN DEV. CTR. OF MINN.,
http://www.adcminnesota.org/page/media-coverage/setting-record-straight-new-marketsmortgage-program-nmmp (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (explaining that the initial purpose was to
provide financing options for African immigrants, but that European-Americans made up half
of the clientele).
118
Paula Woessner, Community Dividend, New Markets Mortgage Program
Broadens Homeownership Opportunities in Minnesota, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
(July 1, 2009), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4228
(describing the formation of the NMMP),
119
Id.
120
See Samatar, supra note 117 (noting that because MHFA was only exposed to
risk after the mortgage was already funded by Devon bank, MHFA’s risk and cost was “very
limited”).
121
Id. (explaining the ADC’s role in training and counseling of first time home
buyers).
122
Woessner, supra note 118 (describing how the process worked).
123
Samatar, supra note 117.
124
Id.; Woessner, supra note 118.
125
See Samatar, supra note 117; NMMP MANUAL, supra note 117, at 28 (“The
mortgage must be originated and closed in, or assigned to, the name of the Seller that is a
party to the Participation Agreement and that has received an Individual Commitment of
Funds from Minnesota Housing.”); Woessner, supra note 118 (stating that there is $15 million
set aside for this program as part of the overall fund to support first time home buyers).
126
Woessner, supra note 118.
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stage where MHFA ultimately purchased the mortgage;127 though, many
other families worked with ADC to become eligible for a loan.128 The
Emerging Markets Initiative garnered notoriety from the George W. Bush
administration in August 2007, before the Islamic-compliant interest-free
loans had gained attention.129 The same governor, Tim Pawlenty, who
accepted the proposal of the Emerging Markets Initiative also created, by an
executive order, The Governor’s Council On Faith-Based And Community
Initiatives on October 7, 2005.130 Pawlenty’s Chief of Staff said, “There is no
Governor more supportive of faith and service.”131 The Chief of Staff also
stated that the purpose of the Initiative was to connect the Minnesota state
government more closely to faith communities within the state by providing
support for them.132Further, corporate counsel for Devon Bank noted that
Devon Bank had never lost money on any Islamic-compliant loans during the
five and a half years it had offered the loans.133 In February 2009, Devon
Bank’s corporate counsel projected the Islamic-compliant loan market to
grow, but was also weary of the potential ill-effects of the housing slump.134
The Pawlenty Administration unexpectedly cancelled the program in
2011.135 The MHFA and the ADC blamed the cancellation on the lack of
enrollment and slow program growth.136 The ADC attributed the low
127
Samatar, supra note 120; Bob Collins, Walking Back Pawlenty’s Islamic Home
Ownership Program, MINN. PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 25, 2011), http://blogs.mprnews.org/
newscut/2011/03/walking_back_pawlentys_islamic/ (quoting Megan Ryan, a spokesperson
for the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, “The program had only three loans.”).
128
See Samatar, supra note 117 (explaining that twenty families were interested
and the pipeline to more families was growing); Collins, supra note 127 (continuing Megan
Ryan’s quote, “There was a lot of interest, but many of the borrowers weren’t credit ready.”).
129
Adam Sorenson, Is There a Double Standard in Tim Pawlenty’s Disavowal of
Sharia-Compliant Mortgages?, TIME (Mar. 25, 2011), swampland.time.com/2011/03/25/isthere-a-double-standard-in-tim-pawlentys-disavowal-of-sharia-compliant-mortgages/#ixzz2
gysIZBrc; Fact Sheet: Compassion In Action: White House Minnesota Conference on Faithhttp://georgewbushBased
and
Community
Initiatives,
whitehouse.archives.gov/government/ fbci/FactSheet-MinnesotaFBCI.pdf (praising
former Governor Tim Pawlenty for having “Led The Charge For Minnesota Faith-Based And
Community Initiatives”).
130
Id.
131
Id. (quoting Chief of Staff Matt Kramer).
132
Id.
133
Jessica Mador, New Islamic Mortgages Now Available in Minnesota, MINN.
PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 25, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/02/
28/islamicfinancing.
134
Id. (admitting the recession had the potential to adversely affect the Islamiccompliant financing agreements).
135
Collins, supra note 127; see also Ben Smith, Pawlenty Shut Down IslamFriendly Mortgage Program, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2011), politico.com/blogs/bensmith/
0311/Pawlenty_shut_down_Islamfriendly_mortgage_program.html (reporting that the
Minnesota program designed to offer Islamic-compliant mortgages was cancelled).
136
Collins, supra note 127 (referencing Megan Ryan, a spokesperson for the
MHFA).
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numbers to the amount of time needed to get low-income people loaneligible, Devon Bank’s limited exposure to low-income loans, Minnesota
Public Radio’s inconsistent explanation of the program in a 2009 article, and
the nationwide home-mortgage meltdown during 2008–09.137 However, a
spokesperson for the Pawlenty Administration issued a statement saying:
This program was independently set up by the Minnesota
state housing agency and did not make any mention [of]
Sharia Law on its face, but was later described as
accommodating it. As soon as Gov. Pawlenty became aware
of the issue, he personally ordered it shut it down.
Fortunately, only about three people actually used the
program before it was terminated at the Governor’s
direction. The United States should be governed by the U.S.
Constitution, not religious laws.138
Pawlenty was campaigning for President of United States at this time and
received criticism about this program from conservative commentators.139
Other Republican Presidential campaigners took a stance against Islamic
law, applying more pressure on Pawlenty to align himself with the ideals of
the conservative base of his party.140 The program was cancelled while over
twenty families were in the process of improving their credit to Devon
Bank’s acceptable rate.141 Other programs originating from the June 30, 2005

137
Samatar, supra note 117 (listing reasons in response to criticism of the
program); Mador, supra note 133 (describing the process of the interest-free loans).
138
Smith, supra note 135 (quoting Alex Conant, Pawlenty spokseman); see also
Collins, supra note 127 (quoting Alex Conant, Pawlenty spokseman).
139
See Adam Swerner, Morris: Pawlenty Knew About Sharia Mortgage Program,
PROSPECT (Apr. 29, 2011) http://prospect.org/article/morris-pawlenty-knew-about-shariamortgage-program (quoting Dick Morris’s book that encouraged readers to share their outrage
over the Islamic-compliant mortgages with Pawlenty directly and also quoting Morris from a
column: “He claims he didn’t know about it. Didn’t know? There were protests at every
Agency meeting. Eileen and I wrote about it in Catastrophe which sold 300,000 copies! If he
didn’t know, he’s a bad Governor. If he knew, he’d be a bad president.”); See also DICK
MORRIS, CATASTROPHE 278–79 (2009).
140
See THE FAMILY LEADER, THE MARRIAGE VOW: A DECLARATION OF
DEPENDENCE ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, available at http://www.thefamilyleader.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/themarriagevow.final_.7.7.111.pdf (“I vow to do so through my: . . .
Rejection of Sharia Islam and all other forms of anti-woman, anti-human rights forms of
totalitarian control . . . ”); William Petroski, Update: Bachmann Is First to Sign Family
Leader’s Pro-Marriage Pledge, DES MOINES REG. (July 7, 2011), caucuses.desmoinesregister
.com/2011/07/07/update-bachmann-is-first-to-sign-family-leaders-pro-marriage-pledge/
(reporting that Michele Bachman, fellow Minnesota political leader, was the first to sign this
pledge).
141
Samatar, supra note 117 (claiming that ADC was in contact with an additional
twenty families).
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initiative targeting immigrant and minority populations are still in effect
today.142
B. Nationwide Legislation Strictly Prohibiting Sharia Law
Legislation intended to invalidate contract provisions choosing
Islamic law have emerged at the state level across the country.143 There have
been ninety-one pieces of legislation proposed in thirty-two different states
banning Sharia or foreign law in that state’s court.144 Six states have passed
laws, either by legislation or constitutional amendment.145 Some state
proposals expressly prohibit “Sharia” or “Islamic” law, whereas other
proposals are a general prohibition of any law outside the United States.146
1. The Model American Laws for American Courts Bill Limits
Enforcement of Sharia Law in State Courts
Some of the legislation prohibiting Sharia law in state courts is based
off a model bill drafted by American Public Policy Alliance (APPA) titled
the American Laws for American Courts (ALAC).147 The APPA is a
142

See MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT AND PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
2012 12–13 (2012) available at http://www.mnhousing.gov/wcs/Satellite?c=Page&cid
=1358904870907&pagename=External%2FPage%2FEXTStandardLayout (expand the list
labeled “Previous Housing Assistance in Minnesota Reports”; then follow “Annual Report
and Program Assessment for 2012) (stating that almost 282 million dollars was allocated to
“Homebuyer Programs,” including “homeownership assistance fund” and “Minnesota
Mortgage Program”); MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY 2013 4
http://www.mnhousing.gov/wcs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1358904866274&pagename=External
%2FPage%2FEXTStandardLayout (follow hyperlink “2013 Legislative Updates”).
143
See generally PEW RESEARCH CTR., STATE LEGISLATION RESTRICTING JUDICIAL
CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN OR RELIGIOUS LAW, 2010–2012 (Aug. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/State-legislation-restricting-foreign-or-religiouslaw.pdf (providing an extensive list of proposed state legislation across the United States).
144
Id. at 1 (adding the legislation described on the list).
145
State Legislation Restricting Use of Foreign or Religious Law, PEW FORUM
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://features.pewforum.org/sharia-law-map/. Note that this map leaves out
the fact that Idaho passed a resolution asking Congress to ban international law in state courts.
H.R. 44, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010). Though not a law, this would make the
seventh state legislature to pass something addressing international law. See PEW RESEARCH
CTR., supra note 143, at 8.
146
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5102 to -5105 (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6001 (2013); H.R. 597, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 14, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa
2011); H.R. 301, 126th Leg. (Miss. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2011); S.J. Res. 18, 50th Leg. Sess., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); Bradford J. Kelley, Bad Moon Rising: The Sharia Law Bans, 73 LA.
L. REV. 601, 613 (2013).
147
See Legislation > American Laws for American Courts Model Act, AM. PUBLIC
POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/model-alac-bill/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2014) [hereinafter Model Act] (declaring “[a]ny court, arbitration, tribunal, or

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss2/4

18

Anderson: Islamic-Compliant Home Financing

2014]

ISLAMIC-COMPLIANT HOME FINANCING

329

nonpartisan advocacy group that specializes in anti-Islamic legislation.148
The APPA has credited itself for pushing legislation across the country to
counter what it considers Sharia infiltration into state courts.149 The APPA
justified the need for this type of legislation by referring to an article
published by the Center for Security Policy.150 The article was part of the
Sharia Awareness Project, a larger campaign initiated by the Center for
Security Policy to raise awareness and counter Islamic law infiltration into
the United States.151 A second instrument in the Sharia Awareness Project
was a website devoted to tracking Islamic-compliant financing
agreements.152 The website cited the report, Shariah: The Threat To

administrative agency ruling or decision shall violate the public policy of this State and be
void and unenforceable if the court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency bases its
rulings or decisions in the matter at issue in whole or in part on any law [that conflicts with
grants of fundamental rights under U.S. or State Constitutions]”).
148
About the American Public Policy Alliance, AM. PUBLIC POL’Y ALLIANCE,
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (referring explicitly to
Sharia legal systems infiltrating the United States as a reason for this legislation); See Model
Act, supra note 147.
149
See About the American Public Police Alliance, supra note 148; see also Civil
Rights > Islamist Organizations in America with the Stated Mission of Imposing Shariah on
Muslim American Families, AM. PUBLIC POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/
civil-rights/pro-shariah-law-in-u-s/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). One example of Sharia
infiltration cited in the report was the Minnesota Court of Appeals case, Abd Alla v. Mourssi,
680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. App. 2004). However, the court decision struck a balance, declining
to make a determination based on Islamic law, but upholding the Islamic arbitration award by
which both parties agreed to be bound. Id. at 573.
150
See Issues > Shariah Law, AM. PUBLIC POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicy
alliance.org/issues-2/shariah-law/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (referencing a study on Sharia
law in American courts conducted by the Center for Security Policy).
151
See The Shariah Awareness Project, SUPPORT SECURE FREEDOM
http://supportsecurefreedom.org/shariahawarenessproject (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). The
project declares:
Under successive administrations of both parties, America’s civilian and
military elites have too-often focused single-mindedly on the kinetic terror
tactics deployed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, but ignored the overarching
supremacist ideology of shariah that animates them. It is past time for
Americans to awaken to the danger posed by shariah and its adherents.
We can no longer ignore the inroads made by these forces into Western
civilization’s European flank. And we certainly cannot delude ourselves
into believing that our homeland will remain immune from their
predations as long as we persist in the same sorts of appeasement that
have brought our friends and allies across the Atlantic to their present,
parlous state.
Id.
152
Id. (directing viewers to www.shariahfinancewatch.org to track Shariacompliant financing agreements); SHARIAH FINANCE WATCH, www.shariahfinancewatch.org
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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America, as proof of the dangers of Islamic-compliant financing.153 The
Center for Security Policy’s corporate attorney David Yerushalmi, was a
primary contributor to the report.154 As another part of the Sharia Awareness
Project, Yerushalmi also coauthored an article arguing that there is a strong
correlation between those who adhere to Islamic law and violence.155 He
argued this showed that Islam is a violent religion.156
Outside of his work for the Sharia Awareness Project, Yerushalmi
wrote the legislation for which APPA advocated, the model ALAC bill.157
Yerushalmi claimed his interest in Islam was fueled by the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City.158 He is
convinced that his research proves that Islamic militants are not the
exception, but are simply average followers of a religion that calls for world
domination.159 In his worldview, Islamic takeover of United States courts is a
very real threat, which is part of the reason he began drafting the model
ALAC bill.160
Yerushalmi, together with APPA, continued to push the model
ALAC bill as the starting point for anti-Islamic legislation across the

153

About Shariah Finance, SHARIAH FIN. WATCH, http://www.shariahfinance
watch.org/blog/about-shariah-finance/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (following “About Shariah
Finance,” directing readers to the report to learn more about Sharia-compliant financing).
154
WILLIAM BOYKIN ET AL., SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA: AN EXERCISE IN
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (REPORT OF TEAM B II) (2010) (listing Yerushalmi, General Counsel
to Center for Security Policy, as an Associate to the report).
155
See Mordechai Kedar & David Yerushalmi, Sharia Adherence Mosque Survey:
Correlations between Sharia Adherence and Violent Dogma in U.S. Mosques, 2011
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM VOL. 5, NO. 5–6 (2011), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/
pt/index.php/pot/article/view/sharia-adherence-mosque-survey/html (explaining that Mosques
are a place where young Muslims read the violent literature of the Qur’an and learn to act on
the violence in the literature).
156
See id. (concluding there is violence in Islamic literature; Islam promotes
violence; Islam promotes jihad; and that this is higher the more “Sharia adherent” that
particular mosque is).
157
Andrea Elliot, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July
21,
2011),
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(describing Yerushalmi’s motivations for drafting the anti-Sharia law).
158
See id. (stating that he was living in Ma’ale Adumim at the time, which is a
Jewish settlement in the West Bank).
159
See id.
160
Id. (believing Sharia law was as big a threat to the United States as the
U.S.S.R. was during the Cold War, he began work on many projects aimed at pointing out the
threat of Sharia law). Yerushalmi faced scrutiny after he made what some dubbed arguably
racist comments in a 2006 article and also for his representation of Pamela Geller, who led a
fight against a proposed Islamic community center near Ground Zero. See id.; see generally
David Yerushalmi, On Race: A Tentative Discussion, THE MCADAM REPORT, No. 585, at 7
(May 12, 2006), available at http://www.mcadamreport.org/The%20McAdam%20Report
%28585%29-05-12-06.pdf
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country.161 The model bill bans choice of law provisions if the chosen law
would not grant the same rights that would be required under the United
States or a particular state’s constitution.162 The bill provides a nonexclusive
list of those rights.163 The bill specifically exempts Native American
tribunals, businesses and partnerships, as well as religious organizations’
decisions on termination and selection of in-house leaders.164 The model
statute makes no reference to Islamic or Sharia law165
2. States’ Statutory Responses to Anti-Sharia Law
Arizona is one of the states that has adopted a law incorporating
parts of the model ALAC bill.166 Arizona’s adoption was not the first attempt
by the state’s legislatures to restrict Islamic choice of law provisions in state
161

Elliot, supra note 157; PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143 (containing a list
of states that enacted legislation based on ALAC language); About the American Public Policy
Alliance, supra note 148 (stating that ALAC language has been used in Tennessee, Louisiana,
Arizona, and Kansas and is still being proposed in many other states).
162
Model Act, supra note 147. The proposed model law provides:
A contract or contractual provision (if severable) which provides for the
choice of a law, legal code or system to govern some or all of the disputes
between the parties adjudicated by a court of law or by an arbitration
panel arising from the contract mutually agreed upon shall violate the
public policy of this State and be void and unenforceable if the law, legal
code or system chosen includes or incorporates any substantive or
procedural law, as applied to the dispute at issue, that would not grant the
parties the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under
the U.S. and [State] Constitutions, including but not limited to due
process, freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any right of privacy or
marriage as specifically defined by the constitution of this state.
Id.
163
Id. (“[I]ncluding but not limited to due process, freedom of religion, speech, or
press, and any right of privacy or marriage as specifically defined by the constitution of this
state”).
164
Id. (“For the purposes of this act, foreign law shall not mean, nor shall it
include, any laws of the Native American tribes in this state . . . Without prejudice to any legal
right, this act shall not apply to a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business
association, or other legal entity that contracts to subject itself to foreign law in a jurisdiction
other than this state or the United States . . . No court shall interpret this Act to require or
authorize any court to adjudicate, or prohibit any religious organization from adjudicating,
ecclesiastical matters, including, but not limited to, the election, appointment, calling,
discipline, dismissal, removal or excommunication of a member, officer, official, priest, nun,
monk, pastor, rabbi, imam or member of the clergy”).
165
Id. (defining foreign law as any law outside the United States).
166
See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 4 (noting that this statute borrowed
language from the model ALAC bill); About the American Public Policy Alliance, supra note
148 (noting that the model ALAC bill has been used by Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arizona)
(emphasis added); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013) (defining “foreign law” as
anything other than the state or US constitution); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3102 (2013)
(establishing the scope as applying to actual conflicts of law and exempting businesses); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3103 (banning enforcement of foreign law).
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courts.167 The Arizona legislature attempted in January 2011 to restrict
Islamic choice of law provisions, but the bills died in committee.168
Undeterred by the bills’ initial defeat, the Arizona state legislature
again attempted to pass legislation in 2012 aimed at restricting Islamic
choice of law provisions in state courts.169 Again, the proposals were
defeated.170 A bill was introduced in February 2012, passed the House of
Representatives and Senate in April 2012 and was signed into law shortly
thereafter.171 Like the model ALAC bill, Arizona’s statute exempts
businesses.172 However, it does not list which constitutional rights may not
be infringed upon by the chosen foreign law.173 Further, the statute is not
limited in application to Arizona courts, but also applies to administrative
agencies or any “enforcement authority.”174
Similarly, South Dakota’s state legislature exhausted many avenues
in an attempt to restrict Islamic law from its courts.175 South Dakota
introduced a constitutional amendment that would prohibit courts from
considering international law, the law of a foreign country, or the rules of a
religious body.176 When that failed, the South Dakota Senate attempted to
pass a bill largely mirroring the model ALAC bill, aimed at restricting the
application of foreign law in courts and arbitration panels.177 That bill failed
as well.178 In 2012, South Dakota introduced a similar bill, but with greater
167
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 4 (listing previous proposals in
Arizona including H.B. 2379 and S.B. 1026 from 2010, S.C.R. 2010 and H.C.R. 3022 in
2011; and H.B. 2582 in 2001).
168
H.B. 2379, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); S.B. 1026, 49th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (listing the first two attempts that tried to ban courts from considering
“religious sectarian law,” which it defined to include “sharia law, canon law, halacha and
karma,” or anything else not of the “Anglo-American legal tradition and principles on which
the United States was founded”); PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 4 (noting the bills
died in committee).
169
S. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.R. Res. 2033, 50th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.R. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
170
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 4 (noting the bills died in committee).
171
Id. (explaining the bill was signed into law on April 12, 2011).
172
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3101 to -3103.
173
See id. (banning any law that would offend the constitutional rights of a state
citizen but not defining which rights).
174
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3103 (“[A]dministrative agency or other
adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority shall not enforce . . . ”).
175
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 27 (listing multiple attempts to pass
legislation).
176
H.R.J. Res. 1004, 86th Leg. (S.D. 2011) (banning foreign law or any religious
code).
177
S.B. 201, 86th Leg. (S.D. 2011) (making unenforceable any court or arbitration
resolution that would not grant the parties the same “fundamental liberties, rights, and
privileges granted under the constitutions of the United States and the State of South
Dakota”).
178
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 27 (noting that the bill died in
committee).
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specificity and exceptions for businesses and Native American tribunals.179
This bill also failed.180 However, South Dakota was finally able to pass a bill
restricting courts, administrative agencies, and governmental agencies from
enforcing any “religious code.”181
3. The Oklahoma Example: The “Save Our State” Amendment
Neither the South Dakota nor the Arizona bills make a specific
reference to Sharia or Islamic law.182 Oklahoma, on the other hand, passed a
facially anti-Islamic law through a constitutional amendment voted on by its
citizens.183 Named the “Save Our State” amendment, it allowed Oklahoma
courts to consider laws from other states but banned courts from considering
Islamic law.184 After a revision by the attorney general adding a definition of
Sharia law, the proposal was left for the Oklahoma voters to decide its
fate.185 It passed with seventy percent of the popular vote.186
The amendment was challenged in the Awad case heard in
Oklahoma state courts before it could be officially certified.187 The court
heard the plaintiff’s claim and concluded the amendment did not allow him
to practice Islam.188 The court also agreed that the plaintiff’s will would not
be able to be probated under the “Save Our State” amendment because of the
references to Islamic law.189 The court found these injuries to be sufficient to
pass the injury-in-fact analysis and a heightened scrutiny looking to the
179
See id.; compare S.D. S.B. 201, with S.B. 136, 87th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2012)
(“For the purposes of this Act, a foreign law, legal code, or system is any foreign law, legal
code, or system of a jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the United States, including
international organizations and tribunals, and applied by that jurisdiction’s courts,
administrative bodies, or other formal or informal tribunals. For the purposes of this Act, the
term, foreign law, does not include any tribal laws of the Native American tribes in this
state.”).
180
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 143, at 27 (noting that the bill died in
committee).
181
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2013).
182
See supra III.B.2 (discussing facially neutral laws aimed at limiting Islamic law
in state courts).
183
Save Our State Amendment, OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (West, Westlaw
through Nov. 2013 amendments); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012)
(explaining the operation of the Oklahoma amendment).
184
OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2013 amendments).
185
Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118 (stating that the Oklahoma Attorney General revised
the ballot to add a definition of Sharia law as law that includes teachings from Muhammad
and the text of the Qur’an).
186
Id.
187
See id.
188
See id. at 1123 (concluding that the Save Our State amendment was an injuryin-fact because it prevented him from practicing his religion by making his will
unenforceable).
189
Id. (finding that the Save Our State amendment would disfavor Islam relative
to other religions, rendering Awad’s will unenforceable).
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merits of the case and probability of success.190 Finally, the court determined
that his right to contract under religious law outweighed the public interest in
preventing him from doing so.191
The Awad case was more procedural than substantive, only affirming
the lower court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction until the case
could be decided on the merits.192 However, the district court later ruled in
favor of Awad’s motion for summary judgment for permanent injunction.193
In summation, many states have enacted laws with the purpose of
preventing Islamic law from deciding disputes in state courts.194 These bills
are advocated for and supported by special interest groups aimed at raising
awareness of the dangers of Islam.195 After the legislative process, some bills
have been enacted as facially neutral, some specifically target Islamic law,
and others have vague language targeting religious codes.196 Finally, the
United States Court of Appeals has ruled strongly, though on procedural
grounds, against the more specific version of the anti-Islam legislation.197
This means that there are widely divergent approaches across the United
States regarding the enforceability of Islamic-compliant finance agreements.
The wide array of possibilities leaves the contracting parties of an Islamiccompliant financing agreement uncertain of the validity of the choice of law
provision it contains. Therefore, the validity of the contract as it was
intended to be enforced is also uncertain.
IV. ANALYSIS
Islamic choice of law provisions need to be enforced for two major
reasons: to encourage economic activity and to promote individual
liberties.198 Islamic-compliant financing has a vast economic effect in

190
Id. at 1124, 1130 (finding that Awad’s injuries traced to the constitutional
amendment and that Awad made a showing that he would succeed on the merits of his claim).
191
See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1131–32 (ruling that the Oklahoma voters’ interests do
not outweigh Awad’s interest in practicing his religion because an unconstitutional law cannot
outweigh an individual’s constitutional right).
192
Id. at 1133 (ruling that Awad had standing and that the lower court correctly
granted the preliminary injunction).
193
Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-1186-M, 2013 WL 4441476 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
194
See supra Parts III.B.1–3 (arguing that even if the statute is quiet on Islamic
law, the purpose behind it is clear from the history).
195
See supra Part III.B.1 (naming David Yerushalmi, APPA, and the Sharia
Awareness Project).
196
See supra Parts III.B.1–3 (discussing only an example from each category).
197
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (describing the procedural grounds
on which the court made its decision).
198
See supra note 101 and accompanying text (introducing the Emerging Markets
Initiative as a business plan); supra note 190 and accompanying text (citing the Awad court’s
decision that a state limitation on contracting in Islamic law presents an injury-in-fact).
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Minnesota.199 The evidence of economic effect is in favor of promoting
Islamic-compliant financing options.200 Legislation banning enforcement of
Islamic law in state courts prevents individuals from practicing their
religion.201 The proposed and passed prohibitions of Islamic law in state
courts therefore hinder economic progress and infringe upon individual
liberties.
A. Failure to Enforce Islamic Law Provisions Hinders the Economy
Much of the proposed legislation attempts to address the economic
concerns by exempting businesses from the Islamic law ban.202 The operative
effect is that businesses are allowed to contract in foreign or Islamic law, but
individuals are barred from doing so.203 This exception is inadequate because
it undermines the purpose of the law and unfairly favors high-income earners
over low-income earners.204 Further, legislation based off the model ALAC
bill prohibits state involvement.205 Even with the business exception, express
prohibition of state involvement removes low-income Muslim families from
the housing market.206 This is bad for the economy because homeownership
represents a significant part of the United States gross domestic product, is
linked to forming small businesses, and is often a family’s principal asset.207
Therefore, a state should increase avenues of homeownership instead of
raising barriers to homeownership.

199

See supra text accompanying note 105 (describing the economic effect of
homeownership).
200
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that homeownership is
good for starting small businesses, contributes to GDP, and promotes higher education).
201
See supra note 188 and accompanying text (citing a Tenth Circuit ruling that
the Oklahoman ban on Islamic law in Oklahoma courts would infringe on Awad’s right to
freedom of religion and would prevent him from executing his last will as intended).
202
See supra note 172 and accompanying text (mentioning the business
exception).
203
See supra text accompanying note 179 (explaining that people are banned from
contracting in Islamic law because of the legislation, but businesses are exempt from the ban).
204
See supra text accompanying note 157 (explaining that the purpose of the
model ALAC bill was to stop Sharia-infiltration into state courts).
205
See supra note 174 and accompanying text (citing an Arizona law which
prohibits administrative agency involvement).
206
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the Emerging Markets
Initiative’s commitment to low-income families).
207
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (listing the economic benefits of
homeownership).
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1. The Business Exception Does Not Adequately Promote Economic
Policies Because It Does Not Allow Low-Income Individuals to Enforce
Islamic-Compliant Financing
First, the business exception is ambiguous as to the enforceability of
Islamic-compliant financing contracts.208 If the purpose is to keep Islamic
law out of state courts, then enforcing Islamic law in business transactions
undermines the purpose of the entire legislation.209 The technical nature of
the process for Islamic-compliant financing agreements often involves LLCs
and banks.210 According to a rigid textual construction, Islamic-compliant
financing agreements should fit into the business exception.211 However, the
purpose of the anti-Islamic legislation is to prevent the enforcement of
Islamic law, including financing agreements.212 The legislative purpose
against this enforcement still leaves the financing agreements open to
attack.213 If businesses routinely enforce Islamic law in state courts, the antiIslamic laws no longer have any real meaning.214 The legislation then only
bars individuals from enforcing their own transactions in Islamic law.215 The
distinction between a business transacting in Islamic law and an individual
transacting in Islamic law is artificial—either way Islamic law is enforced in
a state court.216 Thus, the business exception still does not clearly address the
enforceability of Islamic-compliant financing agreements.
Second, the business exception is bad for the economy because it
only favors a few and prevents a majority of the population from accessing
the housing market.217 Not only does the technical nature of Islamiccompliant financing involve businesses, but it also involves complicated
208

See supra note 164 and accompanying text (introducing the business exception
through the model ALAC bill).
209
See supra text accompanying note 149 (explaining that the purpose of the
Model ALAC bill was to keep Islamic law out of state courts).
210
See supra text accompanying note 36 (describing Islamic-compliant financing
options that involve the use of a limited liability company).
211
See supra note 164 and accompanying text (citing the model ALAC bill’s
exception, which allows limited liability companies to contract in foreign law).
212
See supra text accompanying note 152 (citing the website that is part of the
Sharia Awareness Project and devoted to tracking Islamic-compliant financing).
213
See supra text accompanying note 149 (explaining that the purpose of the
model ALAC bill was to counter Sharia infiltration into state courts).
214
See supra note 150 and accompanying text (citing a study that lists cases that
involved Islamic law in support of legislation that would prevent the enforceability Islamic
law in the future).
215
See supra note 164 and accompanying text (citing the model ALAC bill that
allows business entities to contract in foreign law as a narrow exception to the general bar
against Islamic law).
216
See supra text accompanying note 164 (explaining that the law would not ban
businesses from contracting in Islamic law).
217
See supra text accompanying note 107 (explaining that the Emerging Markets
Initiative was created to aid low income and immigrant populations).
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language and difficult economic concepts.218 The level of technicality makes
these agreements difficult for individuals who are not financially savvy.219
High-income earning Muslims were not having trouble finding Islamiccompliant financing even before the Emerging Markets Initiative.220 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac drove an increase in Islamic-financing agreements, but
high-income earners were already getting this type of loan.221 Devon Bank
was already issuing loans to high-income earners and was optimistic about
expanding to low-income earners through the ADC.222 The Emerging
Markets Initiative was specifically tailored for low-income families.223 Lowincome earners need more than the existence of the loans; they need access,
availability, and assistance to get to a point where they are financially
eligible.224 The business exception does nothing to address that need.225
2. Banning State Involvement in Islamic-Compliant Contracts Blocks LowIncome Muslims from Buying Homes and Is Therefore Bad for the
Economy
First, laws that explicitly ban state agency involvement in Islamiccompliant contracts produce negative economic effects because low-income
Muslim families often need government assistance to afford a home.226
Despite the existence of Islamic-compliant financing, many low-income

218

See supra text accompanying note 48 (highlighting some of the technical
language and concepts involved in Islamic-compliant financing agreements).
219
See supra text accompanying note 48 (explaining that the language is difficult
to understand).
220
See supra text accompanying note 137 (explaining that the NMMP was the
first time Devon Bank had been involved with income loans); see supra text accompanying
note 133 (stating that Devon Bank had never lost money on Islamic-compliant loans that were
given to high-income earners).
221
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the dramatic increase in
Islamic-compliant financing after Fannie Mae involvement); supra text accompanying note
137 (explaining that the NMMP was the first time Devon Bank had been involved with lowincome loans).
222
See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that Devon Bank was optimistic
about the loans because it had never lost money on Islamic-compliant loans in the past).
223
See supra text accompanying note 108 (explaining that the Emerging Markets
Initiative was created to aid low-income families).
224
See supra text accompanying notes 121–122 (describing ADC’s role in
working with low-income families to get them ready for a home loan).
225
See supra text accompanying note 164 (explaining that the exception simply
allows for businesses to contract in Islamic law, but considering the evidence that low-income
earners need more assistance, the narrow exception does nothing to aid them).
226
See supra text accompanying note 174 (prohibiting government agencies’
involvement in Islamic law in the Arizona statute); supra text accompanying note 181
(prohibiting government agencies’ involvement in Islamic law in the South Dakota statute);
supra text accompanying note 120 (explaining MHFA’s role in the NMMP).
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Muslim families had no real access to it.227 The Initiative sought to address
the need by providing avenues to overcome homeownership barriers and
access to home financing.228 After seeing the positive effect Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac had on Islamic-compliant financing nationwide, the Emerging
Markets Initiative sought to reproduce that success in Minnesota.229 The
ADC could have provided the boost to homeownership in Minnesota that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided nationwide.230 The MHFA was the
state agency involved, however limited.231 This would violate any of the antiIslamic legislation that has been passed, and most that has been
introduced.232 High-income earners who do not need state involvement to
qualify for a loan, and who are economically savvy enough to find the
Islamic-compliant loans, may have their agreements enforceable under the
business exception.233 However, low-income earners who need state
involvement would not be so lucky.234 Therefore, laws that ban state agency
involvement in Islamic-compliant contracts are detrimental to the economy
because they prevent low-income Muslim families from buying a home.
Second, banning the enforcement of Islamic law for Islamiccompliant financing agreements takes an entire demographic out of the

227
See supra text accompanying note 104 (noting the trend tended towards a large
gap in homeownership and establishing the Emerging Markets Initiative to reverse that trend);
supra text accompanying note 137 (explaining that the NMMP was the first time Devon Bank
had been involved with low-income loans); see supra note 38 and accompanying text
(describing the success of Lariba with Islamic-compliant loans); supra text accompanying
note 108 (explaining that the Emerging Markets Initiative was created to aid low-income
families).
228
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining that the Emerging
Markets Initiative was created to establish avenues for homeownership among low-income
immigrant populations).
229
See supra text and accompanying note 107 (describing Fannie Mae’s role in
creating the Emerging Markets Initiative).
230
See supra text and accompanying notes 128–129 (noting that more people were
working to be loan eligible and that the overall Emerging Markets Initiative had gained
recognition from President George W. Bush).
231
See supra text and accompanying note 125 (describing MHFA’s role in the
NMMP).
232
See supra text and accompanying note 174 (prohibiting government agencies’
involvement in Islamic law in the Arizona statute); supra text and accompanying note 181
(prohibiting government agencies’ involvement in Islamic law in the South Dakota statute);
supra text and accompanying note 120 (explaining MHFA’s role in the NMMP).
233
See supra note 164 and accompanying text (citing the model ALAC bill that
allows business entities to contract in foreign law as a narrow exception to the general bar
against Islamic law).
234
See supra text and accompanying note 174 (prohibiting government agencies’
involvement in Islamic law in the Arizona statute); supra text and accompanying note 181
(prohibiting government agencies’ involvement in Islamic law in the South Dakota statute);
supra text and accompanying note 120 (explaining MHFA’s role in the NMMP).
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housing market for all practical purposes.235 This is not only damaging to the
Muslim population that is left without a home financing option, but it is
economically irresponsible for the state as a whole.236 Homeownership
produces many benefits for the economy, and the home is usually an
American family’s most valuable asset.237 The Muslim immigrant population
is one of the largest growing immigrant populations in Minnesota.238
Minnesota has historically ranked among the worst in the United States in
homeownership for immigrants and people of color.239 As a matter of sound
economic policy, states should be trying to increase access to the market
rather than enacting policies that discourage it.240 Homeownership benefits
the state economy in a number of ways, and increasing the homeownership
market helps the overall health of the economy.241 Therefore, it makes sense
economically to find ways to include this growing demographic in the
homeownership market. This was precisely the point of the NMMP.242
B. Banning Islamic-Compliant Financing Infringes upon Personal
Liberties
Failing to allow individuals, banks, and government agencies to draft
and enforce Islamic-compliant financing also constrains individual
liberties.243 Freedom to contract, freedom of religion, and freedom to
participate in the American Dream are systemically denied to Muslims

235

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing the Islamic-compliant
financing market as small but growing); supra text and accompanying note 100 (explaining
the growing population of immigrants from predominately Muslim nations).
236
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining the economic benefits
of increasing homeownership).
237
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that homeownership is
good for starting small businesses, contributes to overall GDP, and promotes higher
education).
238
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (listing the demographics of
Minnesota’s immigrant population).
239
See supra note 101 and accompanying text (citing Minnesota’s rank among
states with low homeownership among people of color).
240
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting the effect Fannie Mae’s
involvement had on Islamic-compliant financing).
241
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that the housing
industry is 15% of the U.S. GDP, homeownership fosters small businesses, that it is a
contributing factor to seeking higher education, that homeownership is “a central element of
the ‘American dream,’” and that the majority of American families have most of their assets
tied to their home).
242
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining that the NMMP was
created to aid low-income Muslim families in purchasing their first home).
243
See supra note 188 and accompanying text (citing the Tenth Circuit ruling that
the Oklahoman ban on Islamic law in Oklahoma courts would infringe on Awad’s right to
freedom of religion).
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because of these bans.244 Often, the bans are contrary to sound public policy
and based off personal biases or political pressure rather than sound
evidence.
1. Banning Islamic Law in State Courts Infringes on an Individual’s
Freedom to Contract and Freedom of Religion
The Tenth Circuit correctly determined that public policy was in
favor of enforcing Islamic contracts to protect an individual’s freedom to
contract.245 The notion of freedom to contract was not explicit in the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion; rather, the enforcement of a will was at the center of the
controversy.246 While the case concerned a will, it could have been any
contract with reference to Islamic law, including a financing agreement.247
The same reasoning can apply to a home financing agreement because both
involve the enforcement of a legal document.248 Like the will in Awad,
financing agreements may make reference to or be tailored to comply with
Islamic law.249 Therefore, Islamic-compliant financing agreements should
receive the same protection as the Oklahoma courts gave Awad’s will to
protect the individual’s freedom to contract.250
The Tenth Circuit made the correct determination that the
amendment prevented the plaintiff from following his religion.251 Freedom of
religion was the central focus for both the Tenth Circuit and district court.252
Islamic-compliant financing agreements are designed to adhere to the Islamic
prohibition of riba.253 Muslims go to great lengths to draft complicated
contracts to ensure the agreements comply with their religious beliefs.254
244

See supra note 188 and accompanying text (holding that the Oklahoman ban
would prevent Awad from executing his last will as intended).
245
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (determining that public policy was
in favor of allowing the will to be enforced by state courts).
246
See supra text accompanying note 189 (detailing the facts of the case,
including Awad’s will).
247
See supra note 189 and accompanying text (ruling that the amendment
disfavored Muslim contracts, not only Muslim wills).
248
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (introducing the three major types of
Islamic-compliant financing contracts).
249
See supra text accompanying note 52 (explaining that Islamic-compliant
financing agreements use language that is intended to comply with Islamic law).
250
See supra note 193 and accompanying text (citing a district court opinion
ruling in favor of Awad’s summary judgment motion after the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of
Awad on procedural grounds that required looking into the merits of Awad’s claim).
251
See supra note 192 and accompanying text (ruling in favor of Awad).
252
See supra note 193 and accompanying text (citing the district court and Tenth
Circuit who ruled in favor of Awad over freedom of religion concepts).
253
See supra text accompanying note 21 (explaining that the prohibition of riba
comes directly from the Qur’an).
254
See supra note 49 accompanying text (explaining that Muslim families will
draft contracts to avoid the riba prohibition).
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Contracting to avoid riba is an exercise of religion because the Qur’an
expressly bans riba payments.255 This type of financing is as much an
exercise of Islam as is executing an Islamic will.256 Therefore, Islamiccompliant financing deserves as much religious protection as an Islamic
will.257
States should adopt the same policy outlined in the Tenth Circuit’s
opinion.258 As the Tenth Circuit correctly stated, the state has an interest in
protecting an individual’s freedom of religion.259 A majority approval of
unconstitutional policy does not make the policy constitutional.260 State
courts should enforce Islamic-compliant financing even if the majority of its
citizens oppose it, because contracting around the riba prohibition is an
exercise of religion.261 The fear of Islamic infiltration of state courts does not
outweigh the long-standing United States tradition of freedom of religion.262
The same reasoning the Tenth Circuit applied to a constitutional amendment
can be applied to statutes passed by legislatures.263 No matter whether antiIslamic law policy is enforced through legislative enactment, constitutional
amendment, or otherwise, the effect is an infringement upon personal
liberty.264 A state infringement of a personal liberty cannot be justified
simply because a majority of citizens favor infringing on that personal
liberty.265 In sum, Islamic-compliant financing cannot be banned simply
because the state’s citizens support the ban.

255

See supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing the portions of the Qur’an that

prohibit riba).

256
See supra text accompanying note 28 (explaining the Islamic beliefs that
influence the prohibition of riba).
257
See supra note 189 and accompanying text (ruling that the amendment
disfavored Muslim contracts, not only Muslim wills).
258
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (citing the court’s analysis that
individual liberty outweighed any state interest).
259
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (explaining that the court has an
interest in protecting a person’s freedom to exercise religion).
260
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (“But when the law that voters wish
to enact is likely unconstitutional, their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad’s in having his
constitutional rights protected.”).
261
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (citing the portions of the Qur’an that
prohibit riba).
262
See supra text and accompanying note 149 (stating the APPA’s concern that
Sharia law is infiltrating state courts).
263
See supra text and accompanying note 176 (explaining the South Dakota
legislature’s process in passing anti-Islamic legislation).
264
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
265
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (explaining that Awad’s
constitutional interest is greater than Oklahoma citizens’ interests in limiting Awad’s
constitutional rights).
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2. Barring Islamic Law in State Courts Prevents Muslim Immigrants from
Achieving the “American Dream”
Barring Islamic-compliant financing agreements prohibits Muslim
immigrants from achieving the American Dream.266 Immigrants come to the
United States with the hope to start a better life—a concept colloquially
known as the American Dream.267 Homeownership is a large part of that
dream.268 A prohibition on Islamic law in state courts bars Islamic-compliant
financing agreements for home purchases.269 This bar on Islamic-compliant
financing represents unequal treatment for Muslim families compared to
other communities, and low-income Muslim families are affected the
most.270 There is no real state interest to justify this unequal treatment.271 As
a result, low-income Muslim families are systemically denied the American
Dream with no real policy concerns to justify the denial.
Fannie Mae and the Federal Reserve Bank created the Initiative to
boost access to homeownership opportunities for Muslim families struggling
to purchase a home.272 Muslim families were having trouble securing loans
to buy homes, as evidenced by the low numbers of Muslim immigrants who
owned homes.273 The ADC was working with over twenty families during
the brief existence of the NMMP, showing that the lack of homeownership
among Muslims was due to barriers to access rather than disinterest.274
Programs, such as the NMMP, which provide assistance in securing Islamiccompliant financing are essential to growing homeownership among
Muslims.
The cancellation of the NMMP represented an inconsistent treatment
for Muslims compared to other communities resulting in an unfair

266

See supra text accompanying note 105 (citing homeownership as a
fundamental part of the American Dream).
267
See supra text accompanying note 105 (stating that homeownership is part of
the American Dream).
268
See supra text accompanying note 105.
269
See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing Arizona’s anti-Islamic
statute, based on the model ALAC bill, as one that bans Islamic choice of law provisions).
270
See supra text accompanying note 137 (explaining that the NMMP was tailored
to low-income Muslim families and that Devon Bank had previously experienced success with
high-income Islamic-compliant loans).
271
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (explaining that the Awad court
found that the Oklahoma’s interest in banning Islamic law was minimal compared to Awad’s
right to practice Islamic law).
272
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (stating that the Emerging Markets
Initiative was created for low-income first time homebuyers).
273
See supra text accompanying notes 100–101 (listing the immigrant
demographics and the gaps in homeownership).
274
See supra text accompanying note 128 (explaining that many families had
shown interest in the program).
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distribution of state funding based on religion.275 The Pawlenty
Administration’s decision to cancel the NMMP because it was tailored to
Muslims was a drastic departure from its leadership in Minnesota’s faithbased community initiatives.276 Most programs conceived from the Emerging
Markets Initiative to target faith-based and immigrant communities are still
around.277 The NMMP was the only program from the Emerging Markets
Initiative to be cancelled because of its connection to a religious group.278
Whereas Pawlenty received praise for his commitment to other faith groups,
he was criticized for his commitment to the Muslim community.279 The
Pawlenty Administration boasted about its commitment to other faith groups
but claimed ignorance of the NMMP’s compliance with Islamic law.280 As a
result, other faith groups are receiving state-sponsored aid for home
financing, and Muslims are not.281 Not only is this fundamentally unfair, it is
contrary to evidence of good policy.
The cancellation of the NMMP denied low-income Muslims access
to homeownership with no real policy argument to justify the decision.282
The housing market experts articulated a need for the NMMP and developed
a business plan to fill the need.283 Because of expert approval and
presidential support, Pawlenty should have been comfortable concluding that
the NMMP was sound public policy.284 In fact, the NMMP was a product of
a committee that created it to address Minnesota’s homeownership gap.285
275

See supra note 125 and accompanying text (explaining that the NMMP was
using the same fund as other programs developed to aid first time homebuyers).
276
See supra text accompanying notes 130–132 (quoting the Pawlenty
administration after receiving recognition from the Bush administration for demonstrating
commitment to faith communities); supra note 138 and accompanying text (stating Pawlenty
administration’s reason for cancelling the NMMP was because the state should not support
Islamic law).
277
See supra text accompanying note 142 (stating that Minnesota is still spending
money on programs targeted at other minority and faith-based communities even after the
cancellation of the NMMP).
278
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (stating Pawlenty administration’s
reason for cancelling the NMMP was because the state should not support Islamic law).
279
See supra note 139 and accompanying text (citing the criticism Pawlenty was
receiving for the NMMP).
280
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (claiming Pawlenty had no
knowledge that the program would support Islamic-compliant agreements).
281
See supra text accompanying note 142 (stating that Minnesota is still spending
money on programs targeted at other minority and faith-based communities even after the
cancellation of the NMMP).
282
See supra text accompanying note 139 (stating that the Pawlenty cancelled the
NMMP during his presidential campaign).
283
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons behind the
Emerging Markets Initiative, as well as the important actors in the creation of the Initiative).
284
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (citing the expert organizations that
helped create the Emerging Markets Initiative).
285
See supra note 106 and accompanying text (stating that Pawlenty created the
committee to address low homeownership among Minnesota’s “emerging market”).
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Instead, Pawlenty acted against the expert recommendations, his claimed
commitment to communities of faith, and President Bush’s support.286 He
cancelled the program to appease the critics from his conservative base
during his presidential campaign.287 As a result, the families that were in the
process of becoming loan eligible, and the many more families that showed
interest, suddenly lost their support—and chance—to obtain financing.288
The American Dream of homeownership was gone.289
C. Minnesota Must Combine Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Success
to Form a Cohesive Policy in Favor of Enforcing Islamic-Compliant
Financing Agreements
The analysis above argued that political forces against Islam played
too great a role in state policy decisions of purely economic matters. The
result is an infringement of individual liberties of Muslims who choose not to
abandon their faith in financial transactions. Further, the economy of the
state needlessly suffers when the policy decisions are based on purely
political justifications rather than rational policy considerations and
extensive economic evidence. The current problem is that Minnesota’s
economic policy regarding Islamic-compliant financing is not based on
economic findings, but instead on political biases.
The solution is to combine Minnesota’s legislative and executive
success with the judicial success in the federal courts to create a policy that
enforces Islamic-compliant choice of law provisions in state courts. The state
court should make case-by-case determinations consistent with the
suggestions in the Restatement.290
1. Applying the Restatement’s Choice of Law Standards and International
Marriage Principles Provides the Courts with a Mechanism to Enforce
Islamic-Compliant Financing Agreements
Any agreement that makes reference to the Islamic prohibition of
riba is intended to be interpreted through Islamic law.291 The references to
286

See supra text accompanying note 130 (receiving praise from President Bush
and stating his commitment to faith communities).
287
See supra note 139 and accompanying text (citing the criticism Pawlenty was
receiving for the NMMP).
288
See supra text accompanying note 141 (explaining that many families were
working with the NMMP program to become loan eligible when it was canceled).
289
See supra text accompanying note 105 (explaining that homeownership is part
of the American Dream).
290
See supra text and accompanying note 54 (explaining the overall policy in
favor of upholding such provisions).
291
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that Islamic-compliant
contracts are intended to be enforced under Islamic law).
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Islamic law that are typically in the agreements are enough to show the
parties intended to be bound by Islamic law.292 Choice of law provisions for
Islamic-compliant financing agreements directing enforcement under Islamic
law essentially seek to ensure that a party to the agreement is never forced to
pay interest.293 Islamic law is rationally related to the financing agreement
and the parties because the parties are Muslims who draft the financing
agreement consistent with Islamic law.294 Forms of home financing, other
than interest-based loans, do not violate any articulable state public policy.295
Courts have already been ruling on conflicts of law issues involving
Islamic law based on public policy concerns.296 In those cases, the public
policy was clearly articulated and the result to be avoided was directly
contrary to well established law, but there is no such clearly established
policy against Islamic law specifically.297 Rather, the Restatement makes
clear that policy is in favor of enforcing foreign law when agreed upon by
both parties.298 Further, the Tenth Circuit stated in Awad that the policy
justifications for prohibiting Islamic law, if any at all, did not outweigh the
policy considerations in allowing the plaintiff to freely exercise his religion
and freedom to contract.299
Finally, Islamic-compliant loan agreements between a person who
practices Islam, a bank that specializes in providing Islamic-compliant loans,
and a third party agency that works with people to secure those loans,
necessarily implicates a strong tie to the chosen Islamic law.300 As discussed
in the Restatement, the stronger the relationship between the chosen law and
the agreement, the greater the public policy concern needs to be to prevent
application of the chosen law.301 In most cases, the strong relationship
292

See supra note 52 and accompanying text (“However, by definition, these
transactions will also include participants that proceed from a different set of principles and
precepts: those embodied in the Shari’ah.”).
293
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that Islamic-compliant
contracts are intended to be enforced by Islamic law).
294
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (stating the Restatement’s rule for
choice of law provision enforcement).
295
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
296
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (listing situations where the court has
ruled on public policy grounds for choice of law provision enforcement).
297
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (citing the Awad court rejecting any
state interest or public policy against Islamic law in state courts).
298
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting the Restatement policy in
favor of upholding the intent of the parties).
299
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (citing the Awad court rejecting any
state interest or public policy against Islamic law in state courts).
300
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing how the NMMP
worked).
301
See supra note 85 and accompanying text (“The more closely the state of the
chosen law is related to the contract and the parties, the more fundamental must be the policy
of the state of the otherwise applicable law to justify denying effect to the choice-of-law
provision.”).
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between Islamic law and an Islamic-compliant contract is enough to
outweigh the policy concerns.302 Thus, Islamic-compliant financing
agreements should not carry a per se invalidation by virtue of being Islamic
law, but should be subject to the same public policy exception as any other
foreign law.303
2. The Executive and Legislative Branches Must Create Laws Which
Support the Creation and Enforcement of Islamic-Compliant Financing
Agreements
Policy cohesion between the three branches of government is crucial
to the success of the economic policy in favor of Islamic-compliant
financing.304 The Restatement’s analysis is most effective if there is not a
state statute banning the enforcement of Islamic-compliant contracts.305
Though not currently an issue in Minnesota, there is a trend across the
United States of introducing legislation that would make Islamic choice of
law provisions unenforceable.306 Fortunately, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals and an Oklahoma district court have already laid the groundwork for
such a situation.307 Though the Awad case dealt with the injury caused by a
will rendered unenforceable by a state constitutional amendment with an
express ban of Islamic law, the same reasoning applies to an injury caused by
a financing agreement rendered unenforceable by a legislative enactment
purporting to be neutral.308 In both contexts, there is a financial injury to the
party seeking enforcement caused by a clear government policy against
Islamic law.309 Like Awad, who would have been unable to have his will
probated if the Oklahoma ban on Islamic law were upheld, many Muslims
are currently unable to buy a home because of state policy against Islamic

302

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (stating the Restatement’s rule for
choice of law provision enforcement).
304
See supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting courts can invalidate
legislative enactments); supra text accompanying note 135 (explaining that Pawlenty ended
the NMMP during his campaign for presidency); supra note 54 and accompanying text
(arguing the legislature needs to adopt such a rule).
305
See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the operation of the
Restatement rule).
306
See supra note 146 and accompanying text (listing the enacted legislation
across the nation).
307
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (ruling against the Save Our State
amendment on procedural grounds).
308
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
309
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (determining that the
unenforceability of the will and testament is an injury-in-fact).
303
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law.310 State policy against Islamic law can be found in legislative acts,
executive orders, or judicial decisions.311 The operative effect is the same—
Muslims are deterred from practicing their religion.312
Ideally, the state legislature would immediately stop anti-Islamic
legislation as was the case in Minnesota.313 However, the executive branch
can undermine a bill’s progress, despite such efforts contradicting the
apparent legislative and judicial policy.314 Thus, the bill will only be
successful if all three branches of government agree on the enforceability of
Islamic law in the state’s court.315
Finally, the state needs to sponsor programs that aid low-income
Muslim families in securing an Islamic-compliant loan. The Emerging
Markets Initiative, proposed by Fannie Mae and the Minneapolis Reserve
Bank demonstrated the strong need for a state to support government
programs that actively assist families in securing the loans.316 The typical
family trying to secure this type of loan is of low-to-moderate income and
needs assistance to even become eligible for a loan.317 The passive policy of
simply enforcing the agreement is not enough.318
V. CONCLUSION
Across the nation, state legislatures have enacted oppressive policies
targeting Sharia-compliant contracts.319 In Minnesota, the executive branch
310
See supra note 162 and accompanying text (citing the model ALAC bill that
bans foreign law in state courts and has been used by state legislatures to pass anti-Islamic
legislation).
311
See supra note 162 and accompanying text (citing the model ALAC bill that
bans foreign law in state courts and has been used by state legislatures to pass anti-Islamic
legislation); supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting courts can invalidate legislative
enactments); supra text accompanying note 135 (explaining the end of the NMMP during
Pawlenty’s campaign for presidency).
312
See supra note 190 and accompanying text (citing the Awad court’s decision
that a state limitation on contracting in Islamic law presents and injury-in-fact).
313
See supra note 166 and accompanying text (explaining the quick defeat of the
Minnesota proposal).
314
See supra text and accompanying note 135 (ending the NMMP during
Pawlenty’s campaign for presidency).
315
See supra note accompanying text 193 (noting courts can invalidate legislative
enactments); supra text accompanying note 135 (describing Pawlenty ending the NMMP is
his campaign for presidency); supra note 54 and accompanying text (arguing the legislature
needs to adopt such a rule).
316
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining that Emerging Markets
Initiative identified a large need for culturally sensitive financing programs).
317
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (citing this as one reason the
program may have had trouble gaining ground).
318
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing the intensive process of
getting loans to the target groups, which resulted in cancellation of the program).
319
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (listing the enacted legislation
across the nation).
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created alternative financing programs in an effort to increase home
ownership.320 However, when political pressures mounted, the program was
cut before it had a chance to be successful.321 The Tenth Circuit has ruled
that the right to contract under religious laws is protected by the Constitution
and interference with that right causes a real injury to the person whose right
is interfered.322 This is the example state courts should follow.323 A joint
effort between the state executive, legislature, and courts must take place to
ensure the enforceability of Islamic-compliant financing agreements.324 A
simple passive policy allowing enforcement is simply not enough.325 States
must follow the lead of Minnesota’s New Markets Mortgage Program in
actively encouraging Islamic-compliant loans for low-to-moderate income
families.326 The legislature and the state courts need to reject any bill that
bears a resemblance to the Model ALAC bill.327 In the absence of such a bill,
the state court should apply the suggested Restatement analysis in favor of
choice of law provisions to Islamic choice of law provisions.328 This solution
is consistent with the American principle of freedom to contract and overall
economic creativity and necessity.329

320
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (Emerging Markets Initiative
identifying a large need for culturally sensitive financing programs).
321
See supra text and accompanying note 135 (noting Pawlenty ended the NMMP
during his campaign for presidency).
322
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (determining that the
unenforceability of the will is an injury-in-fact).
323
See supra text accompanying note 192 (describing the court’s ruling in Awad).
324
See supra note accompanying text 193 (noting courts can invalidate legislative
enactments); supra text accompanying note 135 (noting Pawlenty ended the NMMP during
his campaign for presidency); supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating legislature needs
to adopt such a rule).
325
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing the intensive process of
getting loans to the target groups, which still ended in cancellation of the program).
326
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (describing the intensive process for
NMMP acceptance).
327
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (describing the legislative purpose
behind the model ALAC bill, which is to prevent Muslims from finding Islamic-compliant
home financing).
328
See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the operation of the
Restatement rule).
329
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (“However, by definition, these
transactions will also include participants that proceed from a different set of principles and
precepts: those embodied in the Shari’ah.”).
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